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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HlCI-I.\ H.I> X. PETEl{~< >X and 
~L\ X I XE 1{. T) l1~rri1~R~C> X. 
f' f (f iII f i, f f.-.· -f { r S ]J 0 H de II f S, 
YS . 
• J. L<) \ \" I1:I.J L PL.\ TT and 
.J()~11:PII ''r· BEERL11~\~, 
Defe ud a uts-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPOXD11~X1.,R 
Case No. 
138239 
RE~POXD11~XT,S' RT_A.TE:JIT~~xr:r OF THE 
X ~-\rrl TRJ~ OF THE C .. -\RE 
~-\~ stated by the appellant~. this is essentially an 
artion for conversion of personal property located in a 
drive-in cafe and for resulting damages, which action 
1 
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was brought by the plaintiffs as the operators and lessees 
of a drive-in cafe against the defendants as the owners 
of the cafe premises. The defendants counterclaimed for 
unpaid lease rentals and damages for breach of the lease. 
DISP·OSITION IN L·OWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a verdict and 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs the defendants have 
appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY DEFENDANTS ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Appellants seek reversal of the entire 
judgment of the lower court and an award to the defend-
ants in the amount of $1,250 on the defendants' counter-
claim. 
IDEN·TIFI,CATION OF T·HE PARTIES AND 
EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Richard N. Peterson and Maxine H. p·eterson, his 
wife, are the plaintiffs and respondents. J. Lowell Platt 
and Joseph W. Beesley are the defendants and appel-
lants. For practical purposes Richard N. Peterson is 
referred to by his own name or as the plaintiff and J. 
Lowell Platt is referred to by his own name or as the 
defendant, both references being in the singular. When 
2 
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~J axine I I. Peterson is referred to she is mentioned as 
up}nintiff's \Vife'' although in fact she is a party plaintiff. 
,Joseph W. Beesley is not referred to at all in this brief. 
'rhP foregoing is consistent with the appellant's identifi-
<'n.tion of thP parties. 
UT. ______ " refers to a page reference in the transcript 
of the trial proceedings. "R. ______ , refers to a page refer-
encP in tlH' record of the case. 
RESPOND·ENT'S' STATE·MENT OF FACTS 
The defendant-appellant's statement of facts pur-
porting to be "an honest and fair extract of the record" 
hardly satisfies that expectation, and hence the plaintiffs-
respondents have chosen to restate the facts as thought 
to be pertinent herein. No attempt will be made to 
delineate the misstatements and improper inferences con-
tained in the defendant-appellant's statement. A glaring 
example of a misstatement of the record which could 
only be calculated to arouse some suspicion of collusion 
is counsel's state1nent on page 10 of the defendant-appel-
lant's brief that "plaintiff's wife was related to members 
of the Edwards family that controls the closely-held 
Arctic Circle corporation." A glance at the record ( T. 
436, 457) reveals the true fact that the plaintiff's wife 
has no relationship whatsoever to members of the Ed-
w·ards family. This fact seems unimportant, but the 
misstatement of the record is hardly consistent with the 
defendant-appellant's assertion that the factual presenta-
3 
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tion would be "honest and fair" and sets thP tone of his 
entire statement. 
During the 1nonth of August, 1960 the plaintiff, 
Peterson, entPred into a lease \vith the defendants \vher( 1-
hy Peterson and his \\'ifP undertook to lease a drive-in 
cafe and premises from the defendants (Exhibit 1). 
Occupancy \Vas to have commenced August 10, 1960 (T. 
11). Because of a delay in getting the\ building ready, the 
plaintiffs \Yere not able to occupy the premises until 
August 23, 1960 (T. 1±). 
On June 10, 1960 the plaintiffs paid an advance 
rental of $1,250 (Exhibit 1, T. 20). By reason of the 
delay to August 23, 1960, in getting in the property, the 
commencement of the monthly rental period was changed 
from the lOth day of each month to the 23rd (T .18). 
The business, not unlike other similar businesses, ex-
perienced some difficulty. The drive-in, however, by the 
summer of 1962 \vas making sufficient to pay the over-
head, rental and utility payments (T. 36). Its 'vorking 
capital, however, was beiilg depleted (T. 36). Neverthe-
less, by August 14, 1962, the business had reached the 
"break-even point" (T. 35, 248, 392). It was Peterson's 
desire to eventually sell the business 'vhich was esti-
mated to have a value at that time of $36,000 (T. 445, 
520). 
4 
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()n th(• 1:1th of ..:\ug·u~t, UH;~, P(~terson and Platt had 
a <·onvPr~ation in regard to thP drivf'-in operation (T. 
35). Hy that ti1ne Peterson had missed a total of two 
ntonth~ rent for prior n1onths, hut had paid the current 
tnonthly rPntal (T. 17-30, 2~9, I~~xhibit :2). Peterson told 
l,lat t. that hP understood that Platt \\·as getting ready to 
huild an offie(• building and that Platt ought to kno'v at 
,,·hat point thP drive-in 'vas (T. 3;)); that the drive-in was 
finall~· at the break-even point (T. 35): and that he 'vas 
intf'r(•stf'd in ~<'lling thP drive-in (T. 35). Peterson 
thought that l~latt, as the o'vner of the property, might 
hP intPrestPd in buying the drive-in (T. 36). Peterson 
a~~nred Platt t hn t in any event the rent would continue 
to be paid (T. B7, 238, 240). 
That same night or early the next morning of August 
14, 1962, defendant Platt, without any notice or warning 
to the plaintiffs 'vhatsoever and without authority of the 
plaintiffs, 'vent to the drive-in premises, changed the lock 
on tlu~ building, parked his camper in front of the door 
and dPnied plaintiffs access to the drive-in and thus 
"took over" the premises ('T. 38-44). On being notified 
of the defendant's action, the plaintiff, Richard N. P'eter-
son. "·ent to the premises and requested Platt to open 
the doors and get the business open and then sit down 
and iron out 'vhat differences there were (T. 39-44). This 
Platt defiantly refused to do ( T. 40-45). Particularly did 
Peterson request that he be given the perishables and his 
5 
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bookkeeping and payroll records, all of which was again 
refused by Platt in an arrogant and defiant manner (T. 
40-41). Defendant Platt would not even let P'eterson have 
access to the telephone in the premises to call the em-
ployees and advise them not to come to work. 
At the time of the lock-out and take-over by the 
defendant, J. Lowell Platt, the following items of pro-
perty were within the premises (T. 93) : 
(A) Equipment being purchased by the Peter-
sons from Arctic Circle, Inc., under a conditional 
sales contract (Exhibit 6). 
(B) Equipment (Exhibit 7) not covered by the 
conditional sales contract. 
(C') · Other items of personal property (Ex-
hibit 7), and 
(D) Inventory (Exhibit 7). 
'The plaintiff later the same day contacted repre-
sentatives of the Arctic ~Circle organization and consulted 
with their legal counsel regarding the situation (T. 411, 
430, 431). Inasmuch as Peterson was indebted to Arctic 
Circle on an open account in addition to his indebtedness 
under the conditional sales contract covering certain 
equipment in the drive-in, a "security" arrangement was 
6 
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~ntPr(ld into (Exhibit 5, T. 411, 430, 431), pursuant to 
,,·hich rPpresentatives of Arctie Circle made a demand 
on Platt the afternoon of August 14th to unlock the 
building so that they could get in, take inventory and 
rPnlove thPir equipntPnt (T. 50-53). Platt again refused 
to let anyonP Pnter the drive-in stating that nobody was 
gPtting into that building 'Yithout a court order (T. 53). 
ThPreafter both Arctic Circle and the Petersons com-
tnenced separate actions against Platt for the conversion 
of their respective property interests and such damages 
as each had sustained by reason of Platt's conduct. 
Arctic Circle eventually settled its claim against 
Platt and in so doing it was expressly agreed that the 
clain1 of the Petersons was not being affected (Exhibits 
5-D and 1~). Peterson, in his action, was seeking (a) 
damages for the conversion of his interest in the equip-
tnent being purchased under the conditional sales con-
tract from .A .. rctic 'Circle; (b) damages for the conversion 
of other personal property and inventory; (c) damages 
for the destruction of his business; (d) damages for 
mental anguish; and (e) punitive damages (R. 1-3, 
79-80). 
The trial court filed a Memorandum Decision (R. 
84-85) and made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
7 
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Law (R. 88-92). Counsel for thP appP llant, on pages -! 
through 9 of his brief has quoted in full the Findings of 
Fact made by the trial court. The trial court entered 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (R. 97-98, also quoted 
on page 2 of appellant's brief), from 'vhich judgment the 
defendant Platt has appealed. 
SCO·P·E OF R.EVIEW 
Counsel for the defendant seems to have miscon-
ceived the scope of review. His argument on appeal is 
essentially the same argument that was made to the trial 
court. He states on page 3 of the appellant's brief, "The 
facts, rather than the law, will determine this appeal, 
although the trial judge committed error of both law and 
fact." This case, of course, is an action at law and, there-
fore, it follows that this appeal is upon questions of law 
alone. In other words, this court is not to now pass upon 
the weight of the evidence nor to determine conflicts 
therein, but to examine the evidence solely for the pur-
pose of determining whether or not the judgment finds 
substantial support in the evidence. This principle is so 
well established that normally it "\vould only receive pass-
ing comment, but in view of the approach taken by coun-
sel for the appellant, the language of this court in the 
case of Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 106 U. 289, 147 
P.2d 875, 878 is cited: 
"'This is a case at law. It therefore follo,vs 
that this appeal is upon questions of law alone. 
That being true the function of this court is not 
to pass upon the weight of the evidence, nor to 
8 
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dt'tPrtnine eonfli<'ts thPf('in. hut to Pxrunine it sole-
ly for thP purposes of detPrlnining "·hPthPr or not 
tlH' judginPnt finds substantial support in the 
t'vidPneP. In so ('Xamining tlH' evidence all rea-
sonahlP prPsumptions are in favor of the trial 
eourt's findings and judgment, and the evidence 
n1ust hP considPred in thP light most favorablP to 
thent. If the findings and judgment are substan-
tiall~" supported h~ .. the evidence, then the court 
ntay not disturb the1n. When, however, the evi-
dPneP is viP\\'"Pd in the light most favorable to the 
judgtnent of the trial court, the conclusion to be 
drawn therefrom is a matter of law, and the ques-
tion \\"hich confronts this court is whether or not 
the court on the basis of such facts ""as correct 
in its conclusions of law." 
AR.Gl1l\[ENT 
POINT NO. I 
THERE WAS A CONVERSION BY PLATT OF PETER-
SON'S PROPERTY AND THE FINDINGS O·F THE TRIAL 
COURT IN REGARD THERETO ARE AMPLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Findings of Fact Nos. 6, 7 ~ 8, 9 and 10 are the Find-
ings that bear on thP conversion. As will be sho,vn, they 
are supported by substantial evidence. 
(~\) The connnencenu:nf of the monthly rental 
period u·as cha.ngrd fronl the lOth to the 23r.d of each 
n1.onth. 
There is no question that the trial court ""as justified 
in finding that the commencement of the monthly rental 
9 
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period "\vas changed from the lOth to the 23rd of the 
month (Finding No. 5, R. 89). Peterson so testified (T. 
18, 19). Counsel for the defendant even admits the same 
on page 11 of his brief. The history of the handling of 
the rental payments is set forth on pages 17-31 of the 
transcript and evidenced by Peterson's cancelled checks 
and vouchers, Exhibit 2. 
(B) On August 14, 1962, the day of the lock-out 
and take-over by Platt, the rental was actually paid to 
August 23rd. 
The evidence clearly supports the finding (No.6, R. 
89) that on August 14, 1962, the day of the lock-out, the 
rental was actually paid to August 23, 1962 (Exhibit 2, 
T. 17-30). It is true that there were two prior months 
for which the rental had not been paid (Finding No.6, R. 
89), but, nevertheless, the current month's rental was 
paid. These facts find substantial support in the record 
(T. 25-31, Exhibit 2). Peterson's cancelled check of July 
23, 19:62 (see Exhibit 2) and Peterson's testimony (T. 
25-31) evidence the fact that the payment made to Pla.tt 
on July 23, 1962 was for the period front July 23, 1962 
to August 22, 1962. Thus on August 14, 1962, the day of 
the "lock-out," the rental "\\7as in fact paid to August 
23rd. Counsel for Platt in Point No. IV of his brief 
argues as he did to the trial court, that Peterson had not 
10 
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pn.irl t hP currPnt Inonth 's rent at the tin1e of the lock-out, 
hut that paynu~nts 'vere being credited to earlier months' 
n·ntnl. 'Phe trial court, howPver, chose to believe the 
tPRtintony of I>etPrson, as supported by his cancelled 
chPeks, that \vhile PetPrson o\vPd rental for two prior 
rnonths, hP ,\~as neverthelPss 1naking payments for cur-
rc·nt n~ntal, and thPy were being received as such, at the 
titne of the lock-out, and payments made for the months 
irninedjately prior thereto were made for the then current 
tnonths (T. 25-31, Exhibit 2). 
Tt isn't a question of '\vhether the payments made by 
PPterson had to be applied to current months' rental 
rather than to the two prior months for 'vhich rental was 
still owing, but the issue was what the parties were 
actually doing . 
. A.s a matter of fact on August 13, 1962, the day 
before the lock-out and take-over, Peterson had assured 
Platt that the rent would continue to be paid (T. 37). 
(C) The defendant never made any demand for 
the pa.ynzcnt of rent or gave notice of any default, etc. 
The court was justified in finding (Finding No.7, R. 
89) that during the period of tilne that the plaintiffs 
occupied the drive-in property, that the defendant never 
at any time made any demands on the plaintiffs for the 
payment of delinquent rental, nor was any notice ever 
given of any default on the part of the plaintiffs in the 
performance of the lease or of any intention on the part 
11 
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of the defendant to terminate the plaintiffs' occupancy 
of the premises (T. 33, 683-684). 
(D) The lock-out, take-over and converszon by 
Platt. 
There is substantial evidence sho\ving that on August 
14, 1962, in the night time or early 1norning, the defend-
ant Platt, ·w·ithout notice or warning to plaintiffs what-
soever, \vent to the drive-in premises, changed the locks 
on the building, and parked his campPr in front of the 
door ( T. 38-45, 50-52, 685). 
Peterson's testimony was that on arriving at the 
drive-in he pleaded with Platt to get the business open 
and then sit do\vn and 'vork out the problem (T. 40). 
This Platt refused to do ('T. 40). P'eterson then requested 
that he be let in to save the "perishables" ( T. 40). He 
was refused ( T. 40). Peterson then asked to get his 
books and payroll and was again denied access to the 
property ( T. -11, 42). Peterson was not even permitted 
to go inside to make a telephone call to advise ''the help" 
not to come to \Vork (T. 43). Platt testified on cross-
examination that even if Peterson had made a demand 
for the equipment and property, it would not have been 
given to him ('T. 686, 687). Platt stated that no one was 
going into that building ( T. 40, 41). The evidence thus 
a1nply supports Finding of Fact No. 8 (R. 89-90) and 
justifies ,c ·onclusions of La\v Nos. 1 and 2 (R. 91-92), 
which conclusions are as follows: 
12 
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''1. J)pf~'ndant, 1 )latt. had no right to Pnter 
thP drivP-in Jn·•·rnises and deny thP Petersons ae-
c-Pss therPto. Jl is con(lnet a1nounted to a forcihlP 
entry as dPfined by Chapter 3() of Title 7S, lTtah 
Code ..:\nnotatPd, 1953. 
H•> By his eonduet thP def('ndant, Platt, un-
la\vfully tPnninated the LeasP, relieved the l)•·ter-
sons of an~~ furthPr obligation to pay rent, n1ade 
hitnsPlf ohligat<'d for damages reasonably flowing 
frotn his tortious act; eonvertPd J>Pterson's pro-
perty within the premises, and made himself obli-
gated for damages allowable as an action of trover 
for such conversion." 
There is no question that this conduct on the part 
of Platt amounted to a conversion of the property in thP 
pretnises. Neither is thPrP any doubt that there was not 
only a eonversion as to Peterson as a conditional vendee, 
hut certainly if not before, then at least by the afternoon 
of .. -\.ugust 14, 1962, by reason of the assignment to Arctic 
Cirele (Exhibit 5-A), there "Tas a conversion as to Arctie 
Circh'. 
ThP faC't that the defPndant called the plaintiff's 
residence at about 8:30 .. A .. l\L on the morning of the 14th 
and talked to the plaintiff's wife advising her that he 
had decided to "enforce clause 8 of our contract," to 
"~hich the plaintiff's "~ife replied, '' ... that is wonderful" 
( 1,. 655, page 19 of defendant's brief), can be of little 
help to the defendant. It is obvious that rather than giv-
ing consent to a lock-out and termination of the plaintiff's 
13 
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business, the expression of the plaintiff's \Yife - if she 
in fact said \vhat the defendant clai1ns she said - could 
have only been an Pxpression arising from the contem-
plation that the defendant \\~as willing to purchase the 
business for she then said, "Do you want me to call the 
help and have them co1ne do\vn so that you can continue 
to run~'' (T. 655). 
In considering the evidence of the existence of a con-
version, it should be remembered that conversion is a 
tort concerned with the possession of property. See 89 
C.J.S., "Trover & ·Conversion," Sec. 3, page 533: 
''Conversion is a tort, a \Vrongful act, \vhich 
in the nature of things cannot spring from the 
exercise of a legal right. The law of conversion, 
it has been said, is concerned with possession, not 
title, conversion being an offense against posses-
sion of property. It may be either direct or con-
structive, and may be proved directly or by 
inference. The essence of conversion is not the 
acquisition of property by the wrongdoer, but a 
wrongful deprivation of it to the O\vner, although 
a temporary deprivation will be sufficient; and 
in consequence it is of no importance what sub-
sequent application was made of the converted 
property, or that defendant derived no benefit 
from his act." 
It is unimportant that on the morning of August 14, 
1962, Peterson made no formal demand for the delivery 
14 
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to hint ot' thP ('quiptnent and inventory, ete. ~urh a de-
nutnd \\'ottld haYP hPPn futile in viP\\' of the fact that 
Platt had rPfUsPd PetP rson the p<'rishablPs ( T. 40), hi~ 
books ( rf' • .t-1) and H<'<'PSS to thP building for the making 
of a tPlcphone call (T. 43). Tn addition, as noted, Platt 
h'Hti fiPd on cross-Pxamination that had such a request 
lH'Pn tnadt\ it 'vould have heen denied at that time (T. 
6S(i-(}S7). 
··A de1nand and refusal are not essential to a 
eonYPrsion 'vhere it is clear that a demand would 
ha VP hPPn uselL'ss or unavailing, if it had hPPn 
made.'' See 89 C.J.S., "Trover & Conversion,'' 
HPc\ :>7, page 561. 
XuniProus authorities are cited in support of the fore-
going 8tatement. 
rehe right of a conditional vendee to bring a suit for 
the conversion of property has been considered. See the 
annotation in 116 A.L.R. 904. A general statement of 
thP principle is found in 89 1C.J.S., "Trover & Conver-
~ion ... ~(\e. 164, page 643: 
··.A. plaintiff having only a special or qualified 
right or interest may recover the full value of the 
converted property, as against a stranger having 
neither title nor right of possession: but, as 
against a defendant having an interest or right 
in the property, recovery is limited to the value 
of plaintiff's interest or right, and to the fair value 
of the property." 
15 
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A conditional vendee rnay "'"ell be entitled to recover the 
full value of the property converted rather than just the 
value of his equity. The reason and basis for such re-
covery being : 
~' ... thP fact that the party having the limited 
or qualified interest is liable over to the owner 
of the remaining interest, and in order to be ade-
quatPly compensated Inust receive sufficiPnt com-
pensation not only to con1pensate himself for his 
own loss but to satisfy thP de1nands of such 
O\Yner." Goldberg v. List, 79 P.2d 1087 (Cal. 1938) 
The case of So1dhern Arizona Bank & Trust Com-
pany v. Stigers, 53 P.2d 422 (Arizona, 1936), involved 
the right of the conditional vendee to sue for the conver-
sion of an automobile. In this case the court pern1itted 
the recovery which amounted to the difference between 
the balance of the car and what he owed on the purchase 
price, but noted that circumstances might exist \vhere the 
measure of the damage might be the full value of the 
property: 
H 'The legal title is not ahvays necessary to 
an action for conversion, hut any special valuable 
interest in the property accompanied \Yith the 
right of possession is sufficient to for1n the basis 
of such an action.' Carvell v. Weaver, 54 c·aL 
App. 734, 202 P. 897, 898. 
"Where the converter of the property is in 
no way connected with its title, the buyer's mea-
sure of damages is the full value of the property. 
Burnett v. Edw. J. Dunnigan, Inc., 165 Wash. 164, 
4 P'.2d 829." 
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l.t is apparent, th('reforf'. that insofar as the Pqnip-
ln£'nt eovPrPd by the Conditional SalPs Contract is con-
ePrne<l, PetPrson had an intPrPst that could he and \vas 
converted. 
rrhe case of Crutcher n. Scott Puh. Co., 253 P.2d D~;) 
( \Yashington, 1!1:>:~), involved an action by a buyer's 
t rusteP in bankruptcy against a seller's assignee for con-
version of property. Suit was brought for the conversion 
of property and destruction of a going business. ln re-
gard to the right of one having a limited interest in 
property to sue for conversion thereof, the court held: 
"'V e think respondent's point is well taken. 
A person who is entitled to bring an action for a 
conversion, although he has a limited interest in 
the property converted, may, as against a stran-
ger, recover the full value of the property. HadlPy 
Warehouse Co. v. Broughton, 1923, 126 Wash. 
356, 218 P. 257; Burnett v. Ed,v. J. Dunnigan, Inc., 
supra: Anstine v. McWilliams, 1945, 24 Wash. 2d 
230, 162 P.2d 816; Angell v. Le,viston State Bank, 
1925, 7~ ~font. 345, 232 P. 90; 53 Am. Jur. 907, 
Trover and Conversion, Sec. 121. 
H ln Corey v. Struve, 1915, 170 Cal. 170, 149 
P. 48, the Supreme Court of California said: 
" 'The rule that the o\vners of a special in-
terest in property may recover only to the extent 
of such interest applies only to cases where the 
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suit is brought against the owner of the remaining 
interest or his assignee.' " 
See also IJrirer 1; • .L1cquisto, 302 P.2d 387 (California, 
1956). 
Since In this case Peterson's obligation to Arctic 
Circle, Inc., \vas cancelled, his recovery \Vas appropriate-
ly limited to his equity in the equipment covered by the 
Conditional Sales Contract. 
On page 27 of the defendant's brief counsPl, in sup-
port of his claim that there was no act of conversion on 
the morning of August 14, 1962, claims that the defend-
ant "had a contractual right under the lease to resume 
possession if there \v·as a default in the payment of rent" 
and the "defendant had a lien, pursuant to the lease, on 
all property of every kind which the plaintiff owned or 
had an ownership interest in, and \vhich was located in 
the building (Exhibit 1)." This claim of counsel is 1nost 
novel and is, of course, totally unsupported by any 
authority. It is true that the defendant claimed to be 
enforcing "Clause 8" of the lease in the lock-out and 
take-over of the drive-in. Nothing in the defendant's 
pleadings indicated, ho\vever, that the defendant \\Tas ever 
seeking to enforce any lien right. Counsel made this 
same feeble argument to the trial court. Judge Faux's 
comments, \\'"hich unfortunately are not in the record of 
the case, were a classic commentary on the forcible entry 
18 
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nn<l detainPr ~tatnte~ of thi~ and other statP~. It is so 
\\'Pll estahli~hPd in this ~tatP as to requirP no com1nent 
or eitation of authority, that one cannot forcibly enter 
propPrty and on~t thP oeC'upants thPrPof. He 1nust resort 
to thP orderly procedures established by la"T (see 'Chap-
tPr :~fi of Title 78, l Ttah Code Annotated, 1953) . 
. :\~ for the claim that the defendant had a lien, suf-
ficp it to state that none was ever pleaded or asserted, 
nor "·a~ any effort ever made by the defendant to follow 
tl1P proc.edure Ly ""hieh such a lien is to be perfected (see 
Chapter 3 of TitlP 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). In 
any PVPnt, as already pointed out, the trial court found, 
and justifiably so that on October 14, 1962, the plaintiff 
had paid the current rental to August 23, 1962. 
(E) The security arrangentent between Peterson 
and ... ·1 ref ic Circle. 
Follo,ving the lockout, take-over and conversion by 
Platt, Peterson contacted representatives of Arctic Circle 
and consulted with Wilford M. Burton (T. 50). As a 
re~ult of this consultation, documents were prepared by 
'Yilford Burton \vhereby Peterson made an assignment 
of all that he had in the drive-in to Arctic Circle for the 
purpose of securing his open-account indebtedness to 
... \rctic Circle ( T. 56, 57, 151-153, 411, 430, 431). The 
arrangement behveen Arctic ~Circle and P'eterson is evi-
denced by Exhibits 5 A, B, C. 
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The trial court revie"~ed Exhibit 5 in detail and dis-
cussed the san1e at length with counsel at the trial of the 
rase ('T. 6-l-69). Though no formal finding of fact or 
conclusion of la'v was made by the trial court in regard 
thereto, the court ruled (T. 67) that by Exhibit 5-A the 
plain tiff sold certain chattels, merchandise, inventory 
and equipment not covered by the conditional sales agree-
ment to Arctic Circle, Inc. The trial court saw in Exhibit 
5-B the background of the security arrangement (T. 68). 
To the trial court the third instrument (E!xhibit 5-C) 
indicated that all title and ownership of the property 
covered thereby vested absolutely in Arctic Circle. Arctic 
Circle thereafter settled its claim against Platt with the 
understanding, however, that Platt would still have to 
settle with Peterson (Exhibit 12). The court interpreted 
Exhibit 5-D, the agreement of November 12, 1962, as an 
agreement between the Petersons and Platt, by which the 
Petersons were granted the right to proceed with the 
suit as though the action between Arctic Circle and Platt 
and the other elements and transactions had not inter-
vened (T. 60). 
The agreement of November 7, 19·62 (Exhibit 12), 
the agreement of November 12, 1962 (Exhibit 5-D), and 
particularly the stipulation of the defendant through his 
attorney during the course of the trial (T. 453-456) are 
all consistent and make it clear that the Petersons are 
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properly pros(\enting the action~ and are the real parties 
in interPst. Arctic CirclP, having settled with Platt, no\\~ 
<·laiJns nothing frotn hi1n (T. 383-385). 
(F) The cont'('rsion a.gainst Arctic Circle on the 
afternoon of .A.-1-ugnst 1-t-, 1962. 
The Pvidence further shows that at least by the after-
noon of August 14, 1962, a conversion had been committed 
n~ to .:\retie Cirele. By reason of the assignment to Arctic 
Circle, the conditional vendor, it became entitled to the 
possession of the equipment and property in the drive-in. 
On that afternoon Ralph Edwards and Don Edwards of 
. :\rctic Circle went with Peterson to the drive-in premises 
(T. !10). They observed tha.t the building was locked and 
Platt's camper backed up against the doorway (T. 50, 
:ll). Platt was informed of the assignment to Arctic 
Circle and demand \vas made on Platt by Ralph Edwards 
of .. :\rrtic Circle that the building be unlocked in order 
that the inventory and equipment might be removed (T. 
53). Platt flatly told them that "nobody is getting into 
that building" ( T. 53). The conversion by this time, if 
not in the morning of the same day, was certainly com-
plete as to Arctic Circle, the conditional vendor of the 
equipment and vendee of other property in the drive-in. 
(G) There 1cas no failure on the part of Peterson 
to ignore or waive the conversion by Platt, and Platt's 
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._ .... ·cttlenleut zcith Arctic Circle left standing Peterson's 
case zcitlz all of its causes of action against Platt. 
On page 29 of his brief counsel for the defendant 
contends that even if Platt's conduct in locking the build-
ing and taking over on the morning of August 14th 
a1nounted to a conversion of the plaintiff's property that 
PetPrson's subsequent assignment to Arctic Circle ex-
tinguished any cause of action Peterson might have had. 
Couns<>l for the appellant argues that Peterson still 
clain1ed o\vnership and dominion over the property and 
grasps at ''election of remedies," "estoppel" or "what-
PVPr~' and claims that any cause of action Peterson might 
have had \vas extinguished (page 30 of appellant's brief). 
It is obviously true that Peterson could have made an 
arrange1nent with Platt \\'"hereby the conversion might 
have been disregarded, forgotten, or ignored. However, 
there is not one iota of testimony to indicate that as 
bet\veen Peterson and Platt there was any intention to 
ignore, \vaive or disregard the conversion of Platt. On 
the contrary the evidence is clear that Peterson and 
..: \ rcti e Circle stood firmly on the conversion ( T. 50, 56, 
37, 151. 153, 411, 430, Exhibit:>). 
"l\y-e, of course, have no quarrel \vith the general 
statPlnent of the la\\'" as set forth in 89 C.J.S., "Trover & 
Convursion," ~88. Such a general stat01nent, ho\\'"PYPr, only 
hegs th0 question. The cases cited by counsel on page 30 
22 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the appellant's brit'f, ho\\·PvPr, arP Ritnply not in point. 
.Johnston 1'. (Jiu('innati lf,11. ('n .. ~-lO S.,,r. -l-~9 (Tenn. 
19:!:2), invoh·pd a fact situation having no eo1nparison to 
the in~tant (lase. In that <·n~P, the plaintiff \vaived the 
clnitn of <·onvPr~ion by allPging an O\\,.ner~hip of thP 
propflrty and a~king for its return and for rental or hire 
for its n~<'. .\~ a Blatter of fact, that election "·as 1nore 
d(-.finitPI~· PXPreisPd ,,·hen short!~· thereaftPr the receiver 
fl<'<'Ppted bnc·k thP property from the defendant and pro-
<·PPded to dispose of it. Stout 'l'. IJ'ultz, 93 s.,,-r. 919 (~fo. 
190(i) ng-ain involvns a eo1npletely dissimilar fact situa-
tion. In that easP, the plaintiff's cow got into the defend-
ant'~ field ovPr a division fencP. The defendant looked 
hPr up and refused to turn her out until the plaintiff 
paid datnages, but after\\·ard 1nade settlement \\·ith plain-
tiff and turned the co\\· out on his "·ritten order. The 
court held, of course, that the defendant \vas not liable 
to thP plaintiff for the value of the cow. In W caldey v. 
fJ'raus, 46 S.,,r. 1070 (Tenn. 1897) the court concluded 
that there \\·as not even a conversion. It is true, ho\vever, 
in TVeakley l'. Erans, supra, that the court did indicate 
that if there had been a conversion involving the same, it 
had been \\·aived by the dealings bet\veen the plaintiffs 
and defendants, inasn1uch as the plaintiffs negotiated 
,,·ith the defendants to sell them the goods involved and 
at all times in their dealings with the defendant treated 
the property as their own. 
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As already pointed out in the instant case, there is 
not one iota of evidence indicating that Peterson in his 
dealings 'vith Platt ever intended to "'"aive the conver-
sion. The assign1nent to Arctic Circle was for security 
purposes only and 'vas simply to place Arctic Circle in a 
position to like,vise de1nand the possession of the equip-
ment and property. 
The testi1nony of vVilford Burton makes it clear 
that there 'vas no intention 'vhatsoever of waiving Platt's 
conversion. His counsel and the action taken pursuant 
thereto 'vere for the sole purpose of protecting both the 
interests of Peterson and Arctic 'Circle ( T. 736-7 44). 
It must be remembered that in the drive-in cafe 
there 'vere inventory items and items of personal pro-
perty belonging to Peterson and particularly the equip-
Inent of 'vhich Peterson was the conditional vendee and 
Arctic ;Circle the conditional vendor (Exhibits 6, 7). As 
already sho,vn, the conduct of Platt "'"as such as to a1nount 
to a conversion of the interests of both Peterson and 
Arctic Circle. Exhibit No. 5, coupled "'"ith the testimony 
of p·eterson (T. 56, 151, 153), Ralph Edwards (T. 411-
430), and Wilford Burton (T. 730-744), makes it clear 
that th0 only intention of Peterson and Arctic Circle was 
to preserve all causes of action against Platt, and at the 
same tin1e give some security to Arctic Circle for the 
open-account indebtedness of Peterson to that company. 
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SuhsPquPntly, on .. \.ugust :20, 1 ~)fi:2, t'vo actions were 
filPd against Platt, one hy PetPr~on in thP instant case 
and one hy Aretie Circle (T. 453, 453). Thereafter, on 
X ovPtnhPr 7, 1 ~)():2, Arctic Ci rele settled its clai1n against 
Platt: nPvPrthPlP~s, with the Pxplicit provision that the 
cnll~P of :H·tion of l)PtPrson would remain (Exhibit 12). 
ThP X ovPtllb(lr 7th HPttlenlPnt Agree1nent between the 
defPndant Platt and Arctic CirclP expressly provided 
that "all rights of Richard N. Peterson and 'vife pertain-
ing to the aetion in the District Court on any settlement 
eontraet "·ith Lo,vell Platt are unaffected." 
()n K OYPtuber 12, 1962, the Petersons and P1att en-
tPrPd into an agreement, whereby its was specifically 
provided that a prior settlement agreement of October 
~' 1 f)(i:2, "·as rescinded as between the Petersons and 
Platt hy reason of a breach on the part of Platt of that 
agree1nen t. 
Counsel for the defendant seems to want this court 
to believ(} that there was some collusion and misdealing 
,,·ith Platt as to 'vhose property and causes of action 
,,·prp being dealt ""ith in the settlement with Arctic ~Circle 
( spe page 35 of appellant's brief). 
Counsel even chose to indulge in the facetious 
analogy of ~~button, button, 'vhose got the button." Such 
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a staten1ent is nothing but Inisleading to this court in 
vie\\. of the ahove n1entioned agreements of November 
7 and N" ovemb0r 12, 1962, to \vhich Platt was a party. 
Particularl~v is the court's attention invited to the 
follo\ving language of the agreement of November 12, 
1962 (Exhibit 5-D): 
H ••• Platt does hert}h~· agreP that the S<'ttle-
ment Agreement of October 8, 1962, is rescinded 
as bet\veen the Petersons and Platt by reason of 
the breach of Platt, and Arctic Circle, Inc., may 
proceed to deal separately and settle its cause of 
action \vith Piatt, in aid of \\'"hich the Pet0rsons 
have executed and delivered a Subrogation (sub-
ordination) Agreement as far as the judgment 
lien of the Petersons in Cause No. 138239, w·ith 
the express understanding and agreement that as 
between Action No. 138239 all parties interested 
and concerned \vi th this action are restored to 
their original position prior to the October 8, 1962 
Settle1nent Agreement, and particularly said Ac-
tion No. 128239 ( 138239) and all rights concerned 
therewith are reserved and are unaffected and 
available to the parties concernPd." 
and particularly is the court's attention invited to the 
express stipulation of counsel ( T. 453-456) : 
''MR HANSEN: We will stipulate, further, 
he was aware of t\vo causes of action. 
* * * 
"MR. HANSEN: We will stipulate that he 
knew that there was a cause of action from the 
Petersons toward himself, and there was a second 
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rausP of action fron1 ;\ r<'tie Ci rele to hintsPlf. 
Hrrl I]~ C( )1 TRT: I don't think that 'vould 
satisfy ~lr. ~fr~lurrny. ThPy have t'vo causes of 
action. 
"~IR. HANSEN: Oh- well, you mean two 
enuses of action within this lawsuit. We will so 
stipulate; I thought they meant two different law-
suits. 
~~we 'Yill stipulatP he knew there \YPrP t,,.o 
different la,vsuits, one from Peterson and Arctic. 
~·Further stipulate, he knew there were two 
causes of action in the lawsuit before the court. 
HTHE COURT: The court will accept that 
stipulation and as to those two matters; so, you 
have in the record, now, stipulation that he kne"\\r 
there \Vere two lawsuits, and, in this Peterson 
la\Ysuit, he kne"\v there were two separate causes 
of action. 
''MR. McMURRAY: Well, there were more 
than two separate causes of action. 
"I take it, it would be all the causes of action 
recited in each of the lawsuits. 
•'He would know that, and was put on notice 
of that. !(new about it at the time he filed his 
Ia,vsuit. 
'~THE COURT: He has stipulated to that. 
h ~fR. l\Icl\Il"'"RRA Y : He says two causes of 
action; we have three in this lawsuit. 
27 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"~IR. HANSEN: I \vill stipulate Mr. Platt 
was vv-ell aware - had full knowledge - his head 
\\Tas bulging \vith facts pertaining to court records. 
-'THE COTTRT: All right. It \vas the court's 
error~ stipulate he knew there were four causes 
of action. 
'" ~rR. HANSEN : We 'vill stipulate he knew 
of both la\vsuits and all causes of action included 
in them. 
'~'THE COURT: All right; you have that 
stipulation. The court recognizes that stipulation. 
You may go from there." 
Befor~ ~igning the agreement of K ovember 7, 1962, 
Don Ed\\Tards told Platt "it \Vould have to be clearly 
understoofl, to protect Arctic Circle, Inc., that our settle-
lnPnt of aetion \vith Mr. Platt did not relieve him of any 
responsibility of the action that him and ~fr. PetPrson 
had pending; that ''Te had to have this - I had to protect 
Arctic ~Circle, Inc., both from ~lr. Platt and also ~Ir. 
Peterson" (T. 299-300). The defendant stated that he 
had no objection whatsoever to signing the agreement 
(T. 300). 
Thus not only \vas the defendant a\vare of the plain-
tiff's case and all causes of action contained therein, but 
hP agreed that such \vould remain ( T. -+53-456). These 
\vnre the very causes of action pursuant to \vhich the trial 
court gave Peterson judgment. How can the defendant 
no\\T in good conscience complain that there \Vas some-
thing that he didn't kno\\' about the arrangement J? 
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\\'hat the rlofendant i>Jatt is aetually doing is resort-
ing to n t.-ehnieal and sp(~eious argument to keep fro1n 
pn~·ing P<'terson for t hP property he had converted. The 
inPqnity of I>Iatt's position is at once apparent. Platt 
ntadP a settlement \vith Arctic Circle as the conditional 
vPndor of the equip1nent (Exhibit 12). Having satisfied 
t hP e Ia i tn of the conditional vendor, Platt, by the argu-
tnent he has resorted to, is now seeking to avoid payment 
to the r.onditional vendee. In other words, Platt, having 
convPrtPd the equip1nent, inventory and other property, 
and having satisfiPd the claim of the conditional vendor, 
no\\· SPPks to leave Peterson Hstanding out in the cold" 
"~ithout anything. In short, the defendant is arguing that 
he should no'v have thP equipment covered by the condi-
tional sale contract for si1nply the value of the vendor's 
interest therein. He 'vould thus take over Peterson's 
business and even deprive him of his equity in the equip-
nlent. The same malicious attitude that prompted the 
defendant to lock the plaintiff out of the business now 
pron1pts hiln to seek, 'vithout compensation, to even 
depriYP Peterson of his equity and interest in the equip-
tnent, inventory and property. 
The justness of the judgment of the trial court is 
made even more significant "Then it is remembered that 
the defendant has such a little respect for the law that 
he considers it "90 per cent bluff" ( T. 383). 
29 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On pages 30 and 31 of the defendant's brief, counsel 
states that '"Arctic never purported to make any re-
assignment or re-conveyance to plaintiff" and that the 
agreement between the plaintiff and defendant ''restored 
them to their respective legal positions as of October 8, 
19,62 (Exhibit 5-D) ." This, of course, is completely er-
roneous. Implicit in the agreements of November 7 and 
November 12, 1962 (Exhibits 12 and 5-D) is a re-assign-
Inent to the plaintiff, and the parties by the agreement 
of November 12, 19'62 (Exhibit 5-D) were not restored to 
their respective legal positions as of October 8, 1962, but 
\Yere restored to their "original position prior to . . . 
October 8, 1962 ... ," and it \vas particularly agreed that 
the action of the plaintiffs ''and all rights concerned 
therewith are reserved and are unaffected and available 
to the parties concerned." 
l\Ir. Hansen's examination of ''Tilford Burton re-
ferred to on page 33 of the defendant's brief is cited by 
counsel in an apparent effort to have the court believe 
that there was some secret plan and arrangement between 
the Petersons and Arctic Circle. Not one iota of evidence 
\Vas produced by the defendant, during a trial that lasted 
several days, to support such a contention. The questions 
propounded to l\Ir. Burton, to \vhich objection \vas made 
and sustained by the court, \vere manifestly objectionable 
for lack of any materiality and as an apparent attempt 
to go behind the written documents and prolong the 
trial, which, as it was, took nearly a \veek. 
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POINT NO. II 
TIIE AWARD OF DAl\IAGES FOR MENTAL ANGUISH 
AND SUFFERING AND TIIE A WARD OF PUNITIVE DAl\I-
AGES WERE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDFNCE. 
Findi11gs of l~,aet Xos. ~) and 13 arP supported hy 
suhstant1nl PvidPtH·e and support the conclusion of the 
trial eourt that the plaintiff should have judg1nent hy 
rPason of 1nental anguish and suffering ( $10.00), as 
,,.Pll as an a\\·ard for punitive damages ($1,000.00) (R. 
90, Dl). The rerord is clPar that the defendant's atti-
t\Hh~ and eonduct in locking Peterson out of the drive-in 
and taking the sa1ne over was defiant, high-handed and 
uneonst · ionable ( T. 39-45, 80-81, 296-297). 
In 17 ..t~.L.R.~d 936 is found an annotation dealing 
,,·ith the precise subject: "Recovery By Tenant Of Drun-
agPs Is Suffieient Injury Or ~{ental Anguish Occasioned 
By 'Vrongful Eviction." On page 938 of the annotation, 
thP annotator notes the following: 
HEven though there is no allegation of physi-
cal injury, and a claim is made for damages due 
to mental anguish or humiliation alone, the courts 
generally permit the tenant to recover. 
"It has been held that the landlord is liable 
in damages for the mental suffering occasioned 
by the 'vrongful eviction, especially where the 
circumstances surrounding the eviction are such 
that it may be regarded as malicious, or con-
stituting a reckless disregard of the sensibilities 
of the tenant." 
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1 n ~npport of this stat(~l!Ient tl1P annotator cites various 
deei~ion~ fro1n variou~ jurisdictions including a decision 
of the SnpreinP Court of the State of lTtah in Hargrave 
I . 7 -q l-~t h 1-u ~)-3 p· ')0 S r . ~ e 1 g 1 • ' ., a ' \:1 , .... ' • .... ~' ~ • 
Peterson's testi1nony as to th<> mental anguish, hu-
Iniliation, embarrassment and anxi(•ty suffered by him 
i ~ uncontested and is certainly sufficient to justify an 
a\Yard for such ('T. 506-507) . 
. As for punitive damages, the observation of the 
Supreme 'Court of the State of ~California in San l?ran-
risro & Sulnt1·ban H 0111e Btttilding Society v. Leonard, 
110 P. 405, -l-11, is right in point: 
"It \Yas not necessary in our opinion for the 
plaintiff to plead more than the alleged forcible 
detainer to entitle it to prove facts \vhich \Vould 
have justified the court in a":arding exe1nplary 
or punitive damages. The charge of forcible de-
tainer of real property necessarily carries with 
it the implication that such detainer is from a 
bad motive, and \Yhat the precise nature of that 
n1otive is - \Yhether it be founded in malice or 
fraud or oppression of any sort - 1nay properly 
be sho,vn under the general averment that the 
detainer is forcible. It 1nay be that the defendant 
in such a case can sho\Y that the force used was 
only In furtherance of the maintenance of his 
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rights: yPt, thP ~tatute having ~aid that surh 
<lPtainPr is in violation of la\\", thP merP charging 
of th<· act presupposp~ thP exi~teneP th~rein of all 
thP f~letnPn t ~ Pssent ial to thP consum1nation of 
the ehargP as it is defined by the statutP, and 
"·llf~ther, as a n1atter of fact, Plements justifying 
the imposition of punitive damages are present in 
the net n1nst, of course, dPpPnd upon 'vhat thP 
proof discloses." 
Punitive dan1agP~ havP frequently hPPn a\\·arded 
incident to conditions of ronvPrsions. Kumerons casPs 
arP eitP<l in the annotation appearing in :J-l- A.L.R. 2d, 
1 sn~. ..\<lditional eases arP noted in 101 .L\.L.R. at page 
+SO. In this annotation, the annotator considers thP 
tnattnr of dispos~H·ssion \vithout legal process hy one 
Pntitled to po~~P~~ion of real property as gronnd of ne-
tion, other than for rPeovPry of possession or da1nage 
to hi~ per~on, h~· pPr~on disposP~sPd. On page 480 the 
annotator ~tates the follo\ving: 
.. The humiliation suffered by the occupant of 
pren1isPs through his forcible dispossession with-
out legal process hy one entitled to possession is 
occasionally considered grounds for recovery of 
damages." 
Particularly are rasPs noted beginning "~ith page 1388 
of the annotation in point. The evidence on this part 
support the finding that Platt \Yas guilty of an overt act 
in evicting Peterson and in converting the property. The 
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n1alicious, high-handed attitudP of Platt was clearly 
Pvidenced on the 1norning of 1\ugust 1-l, 196~, when Peter-
son pleaded \vith him to get the business open for busi-
ness that day (T. 36-45). To this plea Platt officiously 
and defiantly stated that no one was going in the build-
ing ( T. 40-45). There ""as no justification for the termin-
ation of the business in the abrupt manner employed 
by Platt. HP had available to him all of the legal pro-
cesses by ""hich he could attempt to terminate the lease 
and regain possession of the property. He had available 
to him legal eounsel with \Vhom he could consult. 
Instead of resorting to a peaceful, amicable approach 
to this problem, the testi1nony of Peterson (T. 38-45) 
and Ed\Yards (T. 294) give substantial support to Find-
ing X o. 9 of the trial court ( R. 90) that: 
" ... the conduct of the defendant, Platt, was 
overt, uncalled for, colored with malice and 
amounted to an unlawful termination of the Lease 
and conversion of Peterson's property \Yithin the 
premises." 
The a\vard of damages for mental anguish and the 
a\va.rd of punitive damages should stand. 
POINT NO. III 
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES WAS PROPER 
AND SUPPORTED THE AWARD MADE BY THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
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In connt-rtion 'vith this issue the trial court In 
Findings of Fact Nos. 10 and 11 found as follo,vs: 
"10. At the timP of the lockout and take-
over by the defendant, J. Lo,vell Platt, the fol-
lowing iteins and property were 'vithin the 
premises, all of which 'vere converted by the de-
fendant, Platt : 
" (a) Equipment being purchased by the 
Petersons from Arctic Circle, Inc. under a 
conditional sales contract (Exhibit No. 6, p. 
1), the value of Peterson's equity converted 
being $8,527.74. 
"(b) Equipment (Exhibit No.7, page 1) 
not covered by the conditional sales contract 
(\ralue: $2,366.19) less the amount of the 
Marvion Sign Obligation ($1,712.00) ..... 
. . . . . . $654.19. 
" (c) Other items of personal property 
(Exhibit No. 7, page 2), having a value of 
$1,644.63. 
" (d) Inventory (Exhibit No. 7), having 
a value of $1,632.00." 
"11. The equipment covered by the aforesaid 
Conditional Sales Contract, Exhibit No. 6, which 
equipment was being purchased by the Petersons 
from Arctic ~Circle, Inc., was a special type of 
equipment manufactured for the particular type 
of business operated by plaintiffs. The equipment 
was of a peculiar and special nature and had no 
ready market value, and as a practical matter 
could only be replaced by the purchase of new 
equipment." 
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In rPgard to the nature and value of the equipment 
converted the unrefuted testin1o11Y of PPterson and 
' . 
l~alph }~d,,,.ards "Tas to the effect that the Pquipment 
\\Ta~ of a ~p(•cia1 typP peeuliar to the plaintiff's bu~iness; 
that n1uch of thP Pquip1nent had lH\Pn 1nanufactun·d Pspe-
ciall~T for the plaintiff's business; that it ,,·ns practically 
ne\v: that it di\l not haYP a rPad~T 1narkPt Yalue; that its 
aetual1na rkut value \\·ould lH· far bPlo\\· its I' Pal or intrin-
sie valu(': and that thP equipn1ent could only hP rPplaeed 
hy the pure hase of ne"r equipn1ent ( T. 1~4, 304-308, ::-~30, 
374). 
ln this connection the courfs attention is invited 
to the annotation in 1 ~ A.L.It 2d at page 902 entitled 
'" :,\Iea~ure of Da1nages For Conversion Or Loss Of, Or 
Damage To, Personal Property Having No ~Iarket Y'" al-
ue." ~:\ sunnnary of the general rule is stated in 89 C.J.S., 
""Trover & Conversion," Sec. 165, page 643: 
Generally, if the property has such a value, 
the value to be taken is its fair market value, 
rather than the price paid for the property by 
plaintiff, a price lo\ver than the market value 
at \Vhich the plaintiff could purchase property of 
like species, quantity, and quality, under a con-
tract he has with a third person, the price at 
which it \vas sold, or contracted to be sold, the 
fair retail price of the property, the 'reasonable 
value' of the property, the par value, or its fair 
value to the owner. If the property has littlP or 
no market value, and is of a special or higher 
nalue to plaintiff, the value to be taken as the 
measure of recovery is the actual and fair val1te 
to plaintiff, provided it is not nzcrrly fanciful or 
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sen.tintt'ntal. JJ"hcrl' thcrt' is no ntarkct valul' for 
the goods in controrersy. other standards. inc!~td­
inq lht· rcphtt('IIU'IIl rallfl', ntay br 'Used to deter-
lnine the ralue of fhf' goods. Jloreorcr, the nHtr-
knt rallll' ll'ill1U'i'('r be adhered to as the absolllfc 
nu'asn re of recovcT.IJ trhere to do so 1rould be (t 
departurf' front the ntore {undrnnental principll' 
of j u.st co 111 }Jl' u sat ion for the in.iury or loss sus-
tained by rt'ason of the conversion.'' (J~:rnphasis 
ours) 
X unteron~ ra~Ps are eitP<l by· the annotator holding 
that \YhPn propPrty ~ueh as \\~as convertPd hy Platt is 
inYolYPd. propPr ~len1cnts to consider in determining the 
atnount or drunagPs are tlu~ follo\\~ing: value to the o\\~n­
er, original cost, rPproduction or replacernent costs, t}tc. 
ThP annotator further points out that a deduction for 
deprPeiation is proper. 
Both PPtPrson and Ralph Edwards testified that 
the Yalue of the equipment in the drive-in 'vas determined 
hy taking thP original cost and allo\ving an appropriate 
dPprt'eiation ba~ed on the anticipated "life" of the prop-
erty (T. 117, 1:2~, 1~:-~, 30-t, 306, 3:21-322). The authorities 
eited by tlH~ annotator in thP aboYP mentioned annotation 
clearly ~upport the proposition that for the kind of 
equiprnen t involved, the cost less depreciation method 
follo\\~ed by the plaintiffs and those 'vho testified on 
his behalf 'vas entirely propPr. 
The testimony of Ralph Ed,vards and Peterson in 
regard to the value of the equipment covered by the 
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Conditional Sales ·Contract and other property items 
was as set forth on Exhibit No. 7 (see also T. 117-129). 
The testimony of Peterson alone was sufficient to 
support the finding of the trial court as to the value of 
the equipment and property converted and the amount of 
Peterson's claim (R. 90-91; T. 117, 118, 133, 138, 139-142). 
There can be no question that both the plaintiff and 
Ralph Ed·w·ards were competent to testify as to the value 
of the equipment and property converted by the de-
fendant (T. 113-116, 118-119, 132). 
'\rP further invite the court's attention to the fact 
that insofar as damages are concerned and the value of 
the equipment, the defendant offered not one iota of 
evidence to rebute the testimony proffered by the plain-
tiffs in this regard. 
POINT NO. IV 
'VHEN THE DEFENDANT PLATT, BROKE THE LEASE 
ON AUGUST 14, 1962, THE RENT WAS ACTUALLY PAID TO 
AUGUST 23, 1962 AND PETERSON BECAME ENTITLED TO 
CREDIT FOR TWO MONTHS ADVANCE RENTAL. AC-
CORDINGLY, THERE WAS NO DELINQUENT RENTAL 
OWING TO PLATT FOR WHICH PLATT WAS ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT. 
As pointed out under Point No. I, substantial evi-
dence was presented from which the trial court could 
find, as it did, that the commencement of the monthly 
rental period was changed from the lOth day of each 
month to the 23rd day of each month; and as already 
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pointed out under Point No. I, on the 1norning of August 
14, 19ti2, the date of the lock-out, Peterson's rent \vas 
netually paid to August 23, 1962, though one-half of thP 
rPnt for December, 1961, and January, 1962, and the 
full a1nount of rent for April, 1962 was unpaid (Exhibit 
~, T. 17-30). 
'Ph u~, on August 14, 1962, the rent \Vas actually paid 
until ~\ugust 23, 1962, though one-half of the rent for 
Det•.ember, 1961 and January, 1962, and the full amount 
of rent for April, 1962, was unpaid. However, as already 
noted, Platt, on June 10, 1960 had already received two 
ntontl1s' rent ($1,250.00) in advance. (See Check No. 1, 
~~xhibit 1.) 
No,v, \Vhen Platt evicted Peterson on the 14th day 
of 1\ugust, he thereby terminated the lease. 
"On the other hand, it is the well-settled gen-
eral rule that where the eviction by a landlord 
is of the whole premises, this will relieve the ten-
ant from liability for future accruing rents. Suc-
einctly stated, the eviction suspends the rent dur-
ing the period of the eviction. This rule results 
from the meaning of the term 'rent,' and from 
" the obligations between landlord and tenant. 
Rent is compensation for the use of land, and 
what the tenant pays rent for is quiet possession 
or beneficial enjoyment. When, therefore, the use 
or possession ceases by reason of an act of the 
landlord, the consideration for the payment ceases 
or fails." 32 Am. Jur., "Landlord and Tenant," 
Sec. 4 78, p. 391. 
Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 172 
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X.E. 3;), 37: 
~'The eviction of a tenant fron1 thP possession 
or enjoy1nent of the demised premises, or any 
part thereof, by the landlord releases thP tenant 
from the further payn1ent of rent. Rent is the 
return made to the lessor hy the lesseP for his 
use of the land, and thP landlord's claim for rent 
therefore depends upon the tenant's enjoyment 
of thP land for the term of his contract. It fol-
lo\YS that if thP tenant is deprived of the premises 
hy any agency of the landlord the obligation to 
pay rent ceases, because such obligation has force 
only fron1 the consideration of the enjoyment of 
the premises. The eviction which will discharge 
the liability of the tenant to pay rent is not nec-
Pssarily an actual physical expulsion from the 
premises or some part of them, but any act of the 
landlord which renders the leasP unavailing to the 
tenant or deprives him of the beneficial enjoy-
Inent of the prPinises constitutes a constructive 
eviction of the tenant, \vhich exonerates him from 
the terms and conditions of the lease and he may 
abandon it. Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, Sees. 
379, 380; Halligan v. Wade, 21 Ill. 4 70, 7 4 Am. 
Dec. 108; Anderson v. Chicago ~farine & Fire 
Ins. Co., 21 Ill. 601; L·eadbeater v. Roth, 25 Ill. 
587; Bentley v. Sill, 35 Ill. -!1± ~ Wright v. Lattich, 
38 Ill. 293; Smith v. Wise & ·Co., 58 Ill. 141; Hay-
ner v. Smith, 63 Ill. 430, 1-t- Am. Rep. 12-!." 
l~ pon the termination of the lease by reason of the 
PYietion, Peterson \Vas entitled to credit for the two 
1nonth~ advance~ rental \vhich equaled the t\vo 1nonths 
rental that had hePn missed. 
Wher0 a tenant has been \Vrongfully evicted: 
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''In a ntunber of <·asPs, it has been held that 
\vherP thP n'nt has hePn paid in advance, the 
tonant tnay recover back the rent paid, or at least 
a proportionate part thereof." 32 Am. J ur., 
··r.jandlord and Tt'nant, '' Sec. 268, page 250. SPP 
also 52 L1.,f.S., ''Landlord and Tenant," Ser. rl-l-:l, 
page 355. 
Plutt, in unla\\·fully PYieting the PPtPrsons fron1 the 
prPtnist~s bPforP th(\ Pxpiration of the rental p<'riod fro1n 
.July :.!:~. 19(}~ to ~\ ngust ~~' l~)(i~, "·aR entitled to no n'nt 
for that pPriod and, therPforP, the PPtersons had a valid 
elaitn to rPeovPr against Platt the n1onth's rental from 
,July ~:3, l9(i~ to August ~:2, 1962 in thP amount of $G:25. 
~l'P 52 c.,J.S., •'Landlord and Tenant," Sec. 531, page 
:~-l~: 
"At comn1on la\v, and in the absence of stat-
utP other\Yl8P providing, rent is not apportionable 
in respect of ti1ne, and the O\vner of the premises 
at the ti1ne of accrual is entitled to the rent for 
the entire period, unless the lease expressly pro-
vide~ that there shall be apportionment. Th1ts a 
landlord who is responsible for termination of the 
tenancy betzveen rent days will not be entitled to 
any part of the rent for that period; ... " (Em-
phasis added) 
~Pe also Jloskozc v. Fine, 198 X.E. 150 (j\fass., 1935): 
··It \Vas said in Highland Trust Co. v. Slot-
nick C~Iass.) 193 N.E. 831, 832: 'The entry by the 
mortgagee under a title paramount to that of the 
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landlord with the demand that the tenant there-
after pay rent to the mortgagee was, in its effect 
upon the tenant's liability under the lease to pay 
rent to the landlord, equivalent to an eviction and 
terminated the tenancy created by the lease. In-
ternational Paper Co. v. Priscilla Co., 281 Mass. 
22, 29, 34, 183 N.E. 58, and cases cited; Smith v. 
Shepard, 15 Pick. 147, 25 Am. D·ec. 432. The rent 
payable monthly in advance under the lease was 
indivisible and not subject to apportionment and 
the termination of the lease put an end to the 
right which the landlord, prior to the entry, had 
under the terms of the lease to require the pay-
ment of rent for the month of April. Smith v. 
Shepard, supra; Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 
580, 583; Sutton v. Goodman, 194 Mass. 389, 395, 
80 N.E. ~608; Hall v. Middle by, 197 Mass. 485, 489, 
83 N.E. 1114. See also, Hammond v. Thompson, 
168 Mass. 531, 47 N.E. 137; Caruso v. Shelit, 282 
Mass. 196, 199, 184 N.E. 460; Welch v. Gordon, 
284 Mass. 485, 188 N.E. 239'" 
See also Gorin v. Stroum, 192 N.E. 90, 93 (Mass. 1934). 
Consistent with the foregoing the plaintiffs contend-
ed at the conclusion of the trial that they were entitled 
to recover against Platt a month's rental from July 23, 
1962 to August 22, 19·62 in the amount of $625. The trial 
court, neverthele-ss, chose to apportion the rental and 
only allowed the plaintiffs the sum of $181.48, the same 
being the prorated portion of the rental from August 
14, 1962 to August 23, 1962. Plaintiffs, however, have 
not chosen to cross-appeal on this matter and have con-
tented themselves "'"ith the a'Yard of $181,48. 
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S{J~I~fAitY 
In summary, the plaintiffs contend that the Find-
ings of Fact of the trial court finds substantial evidence 
in Uu.' record and the Conclusions of Law made and judg-
ment enterPd should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY AND BURTON 
and 
MACOY A. McMURRAY 
By1if.!:!~t!~~-~--~-~~~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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